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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Suppose that an American company enters into a contract with a 
subsidiary of a foreign country.  The deal falls apart after the contract is 
nearly complete.  According to the investment contract, all contractual 
disputes must be resolved through arbitration in the foreign country.  The 
American company initiates arbitration, but then the foreign government 
adopts a series of substantive and procedural measures intended to harm the 
American company’s interests.   Though the international arbitration panel 
proceeds to find in favor of the American company, the foreign country’s 
courts later annul the favorable award.  Under such circumstances, can the 
American company nonetheless enforce the favorable award in the United 
States or in another foreign country?  Does this answer accord with 
international arbitration practice?   
Such a scenario recently confronted the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Corporación Mexicana De Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. De C.V. 
(COMMISA) v. Pemex-Exploración y Producción (PEP).1  There, the Second 
Circuit upheld the Southern District of New York’s enforcement of an 
arbitration award annulled in Mexico, the forum state.2  This brought at least a 
temporary end to the thirteen-year dispute between COMMISA and PEP.3  
The Second Circuit concluded that the district court’s holding was in line with 
the Panama and New York Conventions, despite the rarity of such a ruling.4  
The court declined to defer to the Mexican court in the interest of international 
comity,5 holding that the Mexican court’s decision to annul the award went 
against the U.S. policy of allowing recourse for contractual violations, and 
procedural technicalities made it nearly impossible for COMMISA to bring 
suit against PEP in any other forum.6  The court reasoned that the enforcement 
                                                                                                                   
 1 See Corporación Mexicana De Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. De C.V. v. Pemex- 
Exploración y Producción, 832 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2016) [hereinafter COMMISA v. PEP]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 As of April 2017, this dispute has officially ended.  In January 2017, PEP filed a petition 
for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court.  While this petition was being considered, the 
parties settled, with PEP paying KBR, COMMISA’s parent company, $435 million.  See 
Chuck Stanley, Mexican Oil Co. Settles $435M Dispute With KBR, LAW360 (Apr. 10, 2017), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/911580/mexican-oil-co-settles-435m-dispute-with-kbr.  
 4 COMMISA, 832 F.3d at 111.  
 5 International Comity is “[t]he principle that one sovereign nation voluntarily adopts or 
enforces the laws of another sovereign nation out of deference, mutuality, [or] respect.”  
Comity of Nations, WEX LEGAL DICTIONARY, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/comity_of 
_nations (last visited Sept. 10, 2017). 
 6 COMMISA, 832 F.3d at 108–10.  
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of this annulled award was justified to “vindicate ‘fundamental notions of what 
is decent and just’ in the United States.”7  
While the Panama and New York Conventions do grant courts 
considerable discretion in the enforcement of arbitration awards, this ruling 
marked the first time that a court enforced an annulled arbitration award 
explicitly on the basis of U.S. judicial and public policy.8  This decision 
changed the judicial landscape of enforcing arbitral awards in the United 
States and furthered a discussion around the enforceability of awards 
annulled in their arbitral forum.  This Note provides a way to categorize 
different approaches to interpreting decisions regarding the enforcement of 
annulled awards and argues that U.S. courts implement U.S. judicial values 
to determine whether to enforce annulled awards.  
Part II of the Note will give a brief overview of the Second Circuit’s 
decision in COMMISA v. PEP before explaining the reasons parties select 
arbitration to adjudicate disputes and the overall purposes and benefits of 
selecting arbitration, rather than judicial litigation to resolve disputes.  It will 
then discuss the prevalence of arbitration clauses in certain contracts, 
particularly in procurement contracts.  This section then explains the 
importance of the Second Circuit’s decision, particularly as it relates to 
understanding the reasons why parties select arbitration to resolve their 
disputes, and the usual deference to international comity when courts are 
faced with a decision to enforce awards arbitrated in a different forum.  Part 
II will conclude by discussing the reason why COMMISA v. PEP was a 
landmark decision, and how this case differed from the only other decision in 
which a U.S. court upheld a lower court’s enforcement of an award annulled 
in the arbitral forum.  
Part III will discuss the ability of states to enforce, or decline to enforce, 
arbitral decisions awarded or annulled in a different forum state under the 
New York and Panama Conventions. This section will also address the 
Federal Arbitration Act, which affords U.S. courts the ability to implement 
provisions of these Conventions.  It will then discuss the history of 
COMMISA v. PEP and the application of these Conventions by the Southern 
District of New York and the Second Circuit to enforce an annulled award.  
                                                                                                                   
 7 See id. at 107 (stating that “although the Panama Convention affords discretion in 
enforcing a foreign arbitral award that has been annulled in the awarding jurisdiction, and 
thereby advances the Convention’s pro-enforcement aim, the exercise of that discretion here is 
appropriate only to vindicate ‘fundamental notions of what is decent and just’ in the United 
States.” (quoting Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 841 (2d Cir. 1986))).  
 8 See generally In re Chromalloy Aeroservices and the Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. 
Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996).  Chromalloy marked the first time that the United States enforced 
an annulled award, but there, the court’s decision was based on a policy in favor of binding 
arbitration, rather than the policy concerns outlined in COMMISA v. PEP.  
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This part will include an analysis of the United States’ Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia’s decision in In re Chromalloy Aeroservices and the 
Arab Republic of Egypt to understand the first time that an annulled award was 
enforced in a U.S. court—twenty years before COMMISA v. PEP was decided.  
An overview of Chromalloy will provide an explanation of one of the three 
approaches that U.S. courts have taken in deciding whether to enforce annulled 
awards.  After a discussion of the “broad enforcement authority” approach in 
Chromalloy, the “no enforcement authority” approach from Baker Marine9 
and Spier10 will be analyzed before finally analyzing the “limited enforcement 
authority” approach under TermoRio.11  Each of these enforcement 
approaches, or rather lack of enforcement in many cases, has revolved around 
an interpretation of the authority courts have under the New York or Panama 
Conventions, as well as a discussion of applicable U.S. judicial policy.  
Part IV will then discuss how other states have interpreted the 
enforcement authority granted under the New York Convention.  Based on 
the same three categories outlined above, this section will focus on “broad 
enforcement authority” in France, a “limited enforcement authority” 
followed by Dutch courts, and the “no enforcement authority” reasoning of 
British and German courts.  This part will also provide a commentary on the 
debate between Jan Paulsson and Albert Jan van den Berg regarding the 
scope of the New York Convention and whether states may enforce awards 
that have been annulled in the seat of arbitration.  
Finally, this Note will discuss states’ underlying protectionist reasons for 
enforcing annulled awards.  This Note will argue that courts that choose to 
enforce or not to enforce annulled awards do so to protect their judicial 
values.  This was the circumstance in COMMISA v. PEP, where the Second 
Circuit’s decision and interpretation of the New York and Panama 
Conventions was a way to protect American judicial values in response to 
the Mexican government’s protectionist measures.  This section will analyze 
the Second Circuit’s deference to judicial principles of equity, res judicata, 
and the importance of providing parties with a forum in which to have their 
disputes heard.  Finally, this part will examine contractual principles 
governing expectations at the time of contracting and risk allocation.  While 
it would seem that the Second Circuit’s decision to enforce the annulled 
award was a way to protect an American company against an unfair 
retroactive application of a law that benefitted a subsidiary of a foreign 
government, by analyzing other states’ rationales for enforcing annulled 
                                                                                                                   
 9 Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd., 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 10 Spier v. Calzaturificio Tecnica S.p.A., 663 F. Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
 11 TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 930 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
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awards, it appears that this was actually a way to protect judicial values 
rather than to protect a particular company.  Ultimately, Western judicial 
systems, particularly the U.S. judicial system, take pride in upholding core 
judicial values of fairness and party autonomy. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The invocation of what commentators have called the “judgment 
recognition framework,” rather than an “arbitration policy framework,” has 
raised debate over the inquiry to be applied to determine whether to enforce 
annulled arbitration awards.12  A judgment recognition framework analyzes 
whether the judgment rendered in the forum state is valid.  An arbitration 
policy framework analyzes whether the arbitral decision frustrated the 
purposes of arbitration. Arbitration is intended to be a method of 
“expeditious resolution of disputes” that avoids “protracted and expensive 
litigation.”13  Yet, the controversy surrounding the COMMISA decision led to 
a protracted and incredibly expensive dispute that will inevitably impact 
future commercial arbitral disputes.  
A.  Selecting Arbitration  
Arbitration clauses are particularly prevalent in commercial and 
procurement contracts because they afford parties the ability to control key 
factors should a dispute arise in the course of a contract.14  Moreover, 
arbitration allows parties the opportunity to select arbitrators with knowledge 
of different legal systems in cross-border disputes to ensure decisions are 
reached in a fair manner.15  Ultimately, “businesses perceive international 
arbitration as providing a neutral, speedy and expert [adjudicated] dispute 
resolution process, largely subject to the parties’ control, in a single, 
centralized forum, with internationally-enforceable dispute resolution 
                                                                                                                   
 12 Donald Donovan et al., Client Update: U.S. Second Circuit Affirms Decision Enforcing 
Annulled Arbitral Award, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON (Aug. 12, 2016), http://www.debevoise. 
com/~/media/files/insights/publications/2016/08/20160812_us%20_second_circuit_affirms_d
ecision_enforcing_annulled_arbitral_award.pdf. 
 13 See Europcar Italia, S.p.A. v. Maiellano Tours, Inc., 156 F.3d 310, 317 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 14 The arbitral process affords parties the opportunity to contractually design the dispute 
resolution process, including the length of testimony, the location of decision making, the 
applicable laws, and the parties who will adjudicate the hearing.  Furthermore, the process is 
much more flexible, confidential, and permanent than traditional adjudication through national 
courts. See Edna Sussman & John Wilkinson, Benefits of Arbitration for Commercial Disputes, 
AM. B. ASS’N (Mar. 2012), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/dispute_r 
esolution_magazine/March_2012_Sussman_Wilkinson_March_5.authcheckdam.pdf.  
 15 Id.  
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agreements and decisions.”16  Arbitration allows for commercial investments 
and international development to be protected when foreign parties contract 
for various services.  
Traditionally, U.S. courts have adopted a judgment recognition 
framework, rather than an arbitration policy framework.17  American courts 
have often relied on the principle of international comity to give deference to 
awards made in foreign jurisdictions by foreign sovereigns.18  This 
deferential treatment provides a way for American courts to avoid 
interference with foreign relations by overturning a decision made by foreign 
sovereigns.  Yet, as will be later discussed, the New York and Panama 
Conventions provide courts with the ability to negate a foreign decision 
under certain circumstances.19  Largely as a result of international comity, 
U.S. courts have generally declined to enforce awards annulled in the seat of 
arbitration.  The controversial outcome in COMMISA v. PEP is only the 
second time that courts have decided to enforce an annulled award.  
In Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic of Egypt, the D.C. District 
Court enforced an arbitral award previously annulled at the seat of arbitration 
in Egypt.20  In Chromalloy, the court looked to Article VII of the New York 
Convention in deciding to enforce the award as to not violate U.S. public 
policy.21  The court analyzed the text of Article VII, particularly its emphasis 
on parties’ rights in the enforcing jurisdiction.22  Ultimately, the court held 
that the United States’ policy of final and binding arbitration of commercial 
                                                                                                                   
 16 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 73 (2d ed. 2014) (citing 
Drahozal, Why Arbitrate? Substantive Versus Procedural Theories of Private Judging, 22 AM. 
REV. INT’L ARB. 163 (2011)).   
 17 Donovan et al., supra note 12.  
 18 See Joel R. Paul, The Transformation of International Comity, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., 19, 19–38 (Summer 2008), http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol71/iss3/2 (citing 
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 
759, 762 (1972)).  In this case, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged numerous doctrines that are 
“judicially created to effectuate general notions of comity among nations and among the 
respective branches of the Federal government.” 
 19 See Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration art. (5), Jan. 30, 
1975, O.A.S.T.S. No. 42, 1438 U.N.T.S. 245 [hereinafter Panama Convention]; Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. (6), June 10, 1958, 21 
U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
 20 In re Chromalloy Aeroservices and the Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907, 908 
(D.D.C. 1996). 
 21 Id. at 914.  See New York Convention art. (7), June 10, 1958, 21 U.N.T.S. 2517 (“The 
provisions of the present Convention shall not affect the validity of multilateral or bilateral 
agreements concerning the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards entered into by the 
Contracting States nor deprive any interested party of any right he may have to avail himself 
of an arbitral award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the law or the treaties of the 
country where such award is sought to be relied upon.”). 
 22 In re Chromalloy, 939 F. Supp. at 913–14.  
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disputes is “unmistakable, and supported by treaty, by statute, and by case 
law.”23  The court declined to extend the previously relied upon principle of 
international comity to the arbitral tribunal, stating that “[n]o nation is under 
an unremitting obligation to enforce foreign interests which are 
fundamentally prejudicial to those of the domestic forum.”24  After the 
court’s decision in Chromalloy, it appeared as though the U.S. arbitral 
landscape would change, and, perhaps, the United States would enforce 
annulled awards regardless of the principle of comity.25  Yet, until the U.S. 
judicial system was faced with COMMISA v. PEP, the courts consistently 
declined to differ from decisions rendered by foreign sovereigns. 
B.  Legal Principles: The Panama Convention, the New York Convention, 
and the Federal Arbitration Act 
The 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) and the Inter-American 
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (Panama Convention) 
were “intended to unify nations and forego regional standards for handling 
arbitration disputes by adopting a standardized arbitration framework, 
thereby doing away with national peculiarities concerning enforcement 
requirements and procedures.”26  Regardless of which convention applies in 
an arbitral proceeding, the outcome in the United States is the same.27  
The Panama and New York Conventions give the member states 
substantial discretion in enforcing awards, yet they “evince a ‘pro-
                                                                                                                   
 23 Id. at 913 (“The Federal Arbitration Act ‘and the implementation of the Convention in 
the same year by amendment of the Federal Arbitration Act,’ demonstrate that there is an 
‘emphatic federal policy in favor or arbitral dispute resolution’ . . . .”).  
 24 Id. (citing Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 
(D.C. Cir. 1984)).  See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895) (emphasizing the protection 
of the “rights of its own citizens” in reaching this decision).  
 25 See Client Alert Commentary, Second Circuit Affirmed Enforcement of ICC Arbitral 
Award Annulled Abroad, LATHAM & WATKINS (Aug. 6, 2016), https://www.lw.com/thoughtL 
eadership/second-circuit-affirmed-enforcement-of-ICC-arbitral-award-annulled-abroad.  
 26 Danielle Dean & Chelsea Masters, “In the Canal Zone”: The Panama Convention and 
Its Relevance in the United States Today, ARB. BRIEF 2, no. 1, 90–102 (2012) (citing Nigel 
Blackaby et al., Overview of Regional Developments, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN 
LATIN AMERICA 3 (Nigel Blackaby et al. eds., 2002)).  
 27 Even if the outcome would appear to be different under the two Conventions, courts have 
interpreted the Panama Convention as an extension of the New York Convention, 
“particularly when analyzing disputes to compel arbitration, determine jurisdiction, and 
disputes over enforcement of an arbitral award.”  Dean & Masters, supra note 26.  Regardless, 
the Panama Convention applies when a majority of the party States “have ratified or acceded 
to the Inter-American Convention and are member States of the Organization of American 
States. . . .”  9 U.S.C. § 305 (1994). 
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enforcement bias.’ ”28  Moreover, Article V of the New York Convention 
states that a state “may”29 refuse to recognize annulled awards “suspended by 
a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, 
that award was made.”30  
Article V provides that:  
1.  A court can refuse to enforce an award at the request of a 
party, if the party gives proof that:  
a. The parties were incapacitated, or the agreement is 
invalid under the law where the award was made;  
b. The party was not given proper notice of the 
proceedings or notice to appoint an arbitrator;  
c. The award is outside the scope of the arbitration;  
d. The composition of the arbitral proceedings did not 
accord with the parties’ agreement; or 
e. The award is not binding on the parties, or has been 
set aside or suspended in the arbitral forum.  
2.  Recognition can also be refused if:  
a. The subject matter of the award cannot be decided 
under the laws of that country; or  
b. The recognition or enforcement would be contrary 
to public policy in the country where enforcement is 
sought.31 
                                                                                                                   
 28 See COMMISA v. PEP, 832 F.3d 92, 105 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim 
& Sons v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 20 (2d Cir. 1997)).  Accord CHRISTIAN BÜHRING-
UHLE ET AL., ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 59 (2d ed. 2006) 
(discussing the New York Convention’s minimum standard for the enforcement of awards).  
 29 Mike McClure, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards That Have Been Set Aside at the Seat: 
The Consistently Inconsistent Approach Across Europe, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (June 
26, 2012), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2012/06/26/enforcement-of-arbitral-awards-that-
have -been-set-aside-at-the-seat-the-consistently-inconsistent-approach-across-europe/ (“On a 
plain reading of the language of the New York Convention, the word ‘may’ denotes an option 
and, therefore, there should in theory be no bar to a state recognising [sic] and enforcing an 
arbitral award if it has been set aside at the seat of the arbitration.”).  
 30 New York Convention art. 5, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517.  
 31 Id. The text states:  
(1) Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request 
of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the 
competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, 
proof that:  
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in Article II were, under the 
law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement 
is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, 
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In COMMISA v. PEP, the Southern District of New York also relied on 
Article VI of the Convention, which states that:  
[i]f an application for the setting aside . . . of the award has 
been made to a competent authority referred to in Article 
(V)(1)(e), the authority before which the award is sought to be 
relied upon may, if it considers it proper, adjourn the decision 
on the enforcement of the award, and may also, on the 
application of the party claiming enforcement of the award, 
order the other party to give suitable security.32  
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) incorporates the Panama and New 
York Conventions into U.S. law and allows the U.S. courts to enforce 
international arbitral awards.33  The FAA allows awards to be vacated: 
                                                                                                                   
failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where 
the award was made; or  
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper 
notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration 
proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or  
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling 
within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains 
decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to 
arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to 
arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of 
the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to 
arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or  
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure 
was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing 
such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country 
where the arbitration took place; or  
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set 
aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, 
or under the law of which, that award was made.  
(2) Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if 
the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement 
is sought finds that:  
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by 
arbitration under the law of that country; or  
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to 
the public policy of that country. 
 32 New York Convention art. (6), Dec. 29, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 2517.  
 33 See 9 U.S.C. § 301 (1990) (stating that the “Inter-American Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration of January 30, 1975, shall be enforced in United States courts in 
accordance with this chapter”).  Accord BORN, supra note 16, at 709. 
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1.  [W]here the award was procured by corruption, fraud, 
or undue means;  
2.  [W]here there was evident partiality or corruption in 
the arbitrators, or either of them; 
3.  [W]here the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in 
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause 
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and 
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior 
by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; 
or  
4.  [W]here the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so 
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and 
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was 
not made.  
(b) If an award is vacated and the time within which the 
agreement required the award to be made has not expired, 
the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the 
arbitrators.34    
“[T]he ultimate test of any arbitration proceeding is its ability to render an 
award which, if necessary, will be recognized and enforced in relevant 
national courts.”35 
C.  History of COMMISA v. PEP 
In 1997, COMMISA, a Mexican subsidiary of the American contracting 
conglomerate KBR, Inc., entered into a contract with PEP, an oil and gas 
subsidiary of PEMEX, the “state oil and gas company,” to build oil platforms 
in the Gulf of Mexico.36  The original contract contained an arbitration clause 
requiring disputes related to the contract to be arbitrated in Mexico City in 
accordance with International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) regulations.37  
The contract also contained an “administrative rescission” provision giving 
PEP the unilateral right to rescind the contract if COMMISA breached or 
abandoned the work, as well as a requirement that COMMISA post 
performance bonds.38  
                                                                                                                   
 34 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2002) (originally codified 1947).  
 35 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY AND 
MATERIALS 704 (2d ed. 2001).  
 36 COMMISA v. PEP, 832 F.3d 92, 97–98 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 37 Id. at 98.  
 38 Id.  
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In May 2003, the dispute between COMMISA and PEP began when 
COMMISA disagreed with PEP’s decision to fully complete the platforms 
before moving them into the Gulf.39  Unable to reach an agreement, the 
parties decided to enter into a new contract, which contained the same 
arbitration and administrative rescission provisions as the original contract.40  
In March 2004, the dispute came to a head when PEP administratively 
rescinded the contract, forcing COMMISA employees from the worksite.41  
In December 2004, COMMISA filed a demand for arbitration with the 
International Chamber of Commerce, per the terms of the contract.42  At the 
same time, COMMISA filed an “amparo action”43 with the Mexican district 
court, to challenge the constitutionality, appropriateness, and timeliness of 
PEP’s invocation of administrative rescission.44  The Mexican district court 
found for PEP in the amparo action, but arbitration had already begun in 
May 2005, before the court reached a decision.45  In December 2007, two 
developments in Mexican law led to COMMISA’s claim against PEP being 
barred in Mexico: the forum for public contracts was changed to the Tax and 
Administrative Courts, which no longer allowed arbitration of such contracts, 
and the statute of limitations on such claims was decreased from ten years to 
forty-five days.46  Another significant change in Mexican law occurred in 
May 2009, when Section 98 of the Law of Public Works and Related 
Services was enacted.  Section 98 stated that disputes arising out of 
administrative rescission and early termination of a contract were no longer 
subject to arbitration.47 
In December 2009, the arbitral tribunal issued its finding in favor of 
COMMISA.48  The tribunal found that PEP had in fact breached the 
contracts with COMMISA and awarded COMMISA approximately $300 
million in damages.49  COMMISA sought to have the award confirmed in the 
Southern District of New York in August 2010.50  PEP appealed.51  
Simultaneously, PEP filed an amparo action that eventually made its way 
                                                                                                                   
 39 Id.  
 40 Id.  
 41 Id.  
 42 Id. 
 43 An amparo action is filed to remedy a lost constitutional guarantee.  
 44 COMMISA, 832 F.3d at 98. 
 45 Id. at 98–99. The arbitral panel would not reach a decision until December 2009. 
 46 Id. at 99.  
 47 Id. (stating that “administrative rescission, early termination of the contracts and such cases 
as the Regulation of this Law may determine may not be subject to arbitration proceedings”). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id.  
 50 Id. 
 51 Id.  
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into the Eleventh Collegiate Court of Mexico, which held that PEP’s 
administrative rescission could not be arbitrated and consequently annulled 
the award set forth by the arbitral tribunal as a result of Section 98.52  PEP 
then sought to have the annulment considered in the appeal from the district 
court’s confirmation.53  After considering whether Section 98 could be 
applied retroactively, as well as the recourse COMMISA would have 
available if the court followed the decision of the Eleventh Collegiate Court, 
the Southern District of New York “decline[d] to defer to the Eleventh 
Collegiate Court’s ruling,” because the annulment “violated basic notions of 
justice in that it applied a law that was not in existence at the time the 
parties’ contract was formed and left COMMISA without an apparent ability 
to litigate its claims.”54 
PEP appealed the award to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which 
upheld the lower court’s finding.55  The Court interpreted the Panama 
Convention to mean that “a district court must enforce an arbitral award 
rendered abroad unless a litigant satisfies one of the seven enumerated 
defenses; if one of the defenses is established, the district court may choose 
to refuse recognition of the award.”56  In considering the public policy issues 
surrounding the award, the Court stated that “[a] judgment is unenforceable 
as against public policy to the extent that it is ‘repugnant to fundamental 
notions of what is decent and just in the State where enforcement is 
sought.’ ”57  This public policy exception seems to “accommodate” “two 
competing (and equally important) principles: [i] ‘the goals of comity and res 
judicata that underlie the doctrine of recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments, and [ii] ‘fairness to litigants.’ ”58  The court made four 
considerations before affirming a landmark decision to enforce an annulled 
award.59 The court considered: “(1) the vindication of contractual 
undertakings and the waiver of sovereign immunity; (2) the repugnancy of 
retroactive legislation that disrupts contractual expectations; (3) the need to 
ensure legal claims find a forum; and (4) the prohibition against government 
expropriation without compensation.”60 
The court ultimately affirmed the award because the result of Mexico’s 
changing laws violated the “domestic principles of claim preclusion” and 
                                                                                                                   
 52 Id.  
 53 Id.  
 54 Id. at 100.  
 55 Id. at 97.  
 56 Id. at 106.  
 57 Id. (quoting Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 841 (2d Cir. 1986)).  
 58 Id. (quoting Ackermann, 788 F.2d at 841). 
 59 Id. at 107. 
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“[a]bsent confirmation of the award, COMMISA would lose the opportunity 
to bring its claims because of the change in Mexican law subjecting 
COMMISA’s claims to the forty-five-day statute of limitations in the Tax 
and Administrative Court.”61  Furthermore, COMMISA’s claims would be 
barred by res judicata, and PEP, “acting on behalf of the Mexican 
government,” would unjustly benefit at COMMISA’s expense.62 
III.  APPROACHES U.S. COURTS HAVE TAKEN IN DECIDING WHETHER TO 
ENFORCE ANNULLED AWARDS 
A court’s ability to enforce or not enforce an award can provide a way for 
courts to protect their judicial values regardless of a decision rendered in a 
different jurisdiction.  The Second Circuit’s decision in COMMISA v. PEP 
employs one of the three approaches taken by U.S. courts in deciding 
whether to enforce annulled awards.  In Chromalloy, the D.C. District Court 
recognized the broad authority to enforce awards under the New York 
Convention.63  Conversely, in Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd v. Chevron (Nig.) 
Ltd.64 and Spier v. Calzaturificio Tecnica S.p.A., Second Circuit courts held 
that they had no authority to enforce awards annulled in foreign courts.65  
Finally, in TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P. et al., the D.C. Circuit 
recognized that there was limited authority to enforce such awards when 
presented with evidence of “tainted” or unauthentic foreign proceedings—
this situation finally transpired in COMMISA v. PEP.66  
A.  Broad Enforcement Authority 
In Chromalloy, the D.C. District Court disregarded the principle of 
international comity and enforced the annulled award—the first time a U.S. 
court made such a decision.67  Here the court faced an investor-state dispute 
over a military procurement contract.68  Finding Egypt liable for cancellation 
of the contract, the arbitral panel ordered Egypt to pay certain sums to the 
corporation.69  After this award was decided, Egypt sought to have it 
                                                                                                                   
 61 Id. at 110.  
 62 Id.  
 63 See In re Chromalloy Aeroservices and the Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907, 
909–10 (D.D.C. 1996). 
 64 Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd., 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 65 Spier v. Calzaturificio Tecnica S.p.A., 663 F. Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
 66 TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 930 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 67 See In re Chromalloy, 939 F. Supp. at 908. 
 68 Id.   
 69 Id.  
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nullified by an Egyptian court.70  The Egyptian court suspended and then 
nullified the award.71  The U.S. court found the arbitral award to be valid and 
affirmed it, despite Egypt’s objections based on the “requirement” of 
international comity.72 
The court first analyzed the requirements to enforce a foreign judgment in 
light of the “U.S. public policy in favor of final and binding arbitration of 
commercial disputes. . . .”73  Looking to the FAA74 and the New York 
Convention, the court concluded that “[a] decision by [the] Court to 
recognize the decision of the Egyptian court would violate [the] clear U.S. 
public policy.”75  The court also analyzed the role of international comity and 
the reach of that principle before finding that the U.S. was not required to 
give res judicata effect to the Egyptian court’s decision.76  Chromalloy 
presented U.S. courts with the first opportunity to discern the enforceability 
of annulled awards.77  This decision allowed U.S. courts to weigh U.S. policy 
and law more favorably than the law of the country of origin in assessing the 
validity of an award.78  After Chromalloy, it was assumed that the U.S. 
would provide a forum for the enforcement of annulled awards, but despite 
numerous opportunities to do so, it took nearly two decades for a U.S. court 
to be presented with a similar enough question to warrant the same outcome.  
B.  No Enforcement Authority 
Surprisingly, despite the pro-enforcement air created by the D.C. District 
Court’s decision in Chromalloy, “[this case] did not usher in an era of 
enforcement of [set aside international] arbitral awards. . . .”79  Following 
Chromalloy, the courts largely declined to enforce annulled awards.  In 
Baker Marine, a breach of contract between Baker Marine, Danos, and 
Chevron involved an oil supply in Nigeria and led to arbitration per the terms 
                                                                                                                   
 70 Id.  
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 913. 
 73 Id.  
 74 See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2002) (originally codified in 1947) for circumstances in which it is 
appropriate to deny the enforcement of an award. 
 75 In re Chromalloy, 939 F. Supp. at 913. 
 76 Id. at 914.  
 77 Id. at 911.  
 78 Id. at 911–14 (citing W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 
Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 409 (1990)).  
 79 Jared Hanson, Note, Setting Aside Public Policy: The ‘Pemex’ Decision and the Case for 
Enforcing International Arbitral Awards Set Aside as Contrary to Public Policy, 45 GEO. J. 
INT’L L. 825, 849 (2014). 
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of the original contract.80  The arbitral panel awarded Baker Marine over $2 
million from Danos and Chevron.81  Danos and Chevron both separately 
appealed the award in Nigerian courts, while Baker Marine attempted to 
enforce the award in the Northern District of New York.82  Unlike the D.C. 
District Court in Chromalloy, the district court in Baker Marine refused to 
enforce the award because doing so would violate principles of international 
comity. 83  On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling.84  
The court interpreted the FAA to “ensur[e] that private agreements to 
arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.”85  Consequently, rather than 
focusing on the rights Baker Marine would have under American law, the 
court deferred to the contractual requirement of Nigeria as the arbitral forum 
and Nigerian law as the choice of law.86  
This scope of enforcement, or rather absence of a scope of enforcement, 
parallels the Southern District of New York’s decision in Spier v. 
Calzaturificio Tecnica S.p.A.87  In Spier, arbitration proceedings began in 
accordance with the terms of a contract between an engineer and an Italian 
corporation.88  Despite the arbitrators unanimously finding for the engineer, 
the corporation sought to have the award overturned in an Italian court.89  
The court relied on Article VI90 of the New York Convention to ultimately 
hold that the award should first be validated by the Italian courts before 
being considered in the United States.91  The court deferred to the rule of 
comity, reasoning that because the Italian government is a competent 
authority,    
it [was] better to permit the validity of [the] Italian arbitral 
award to be first tested under Italian law by Italian courts.  That 
is preferable to an American court seeking to apply the law of 
the foreign country where the award was made, and entering an 
                                                                                                                   
 80 Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd., 191 F.3d 194, 195 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 81 Id. at 196. 
 82 Id.  
 83 Id. (stating that under the New York Convention, FAA, and principles of comity “it 
would not be proper to enforce a foreign arbitral award under the Convention when such an 
award has been set aside by the Nigerian courts”). 
 84 Id. at 198. 
 85 Id. at 197.  
 86 Id.  
 87 Spier v. Calzaturificio Tecnica S.p.A., 663 F. Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
 88 Id. at 872.  
 89 Id.  
 90 See The New York Convention art. (6), June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517.  
 91 Spier, 663 F. Supp. at 875.  
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order enforcing an award later condemned by the courts of that 
foreign country.92  
While some differences do exist between the rationales in Spier and Baker 
Marine, in both instances the courts deferred to the national courts of the 
forum where the arbitral award was issued.  This reliance on the principle of 
comity stands in stark contrast to the emphasis placed on the application of 
American law by the D.C. District Court in Chromalloy.  It is evident that 
during the twenty years between the D.C. District Court’s decision in 
Chromalloy and the 2013 decision by the Southern District of New York in 
COMMISA v. PEP, the effect of Chromalloy was hardly felt as courts declined 
to enforce awards that had been annulled or set aside at the seat of arbitration.93  
C.  Limited Enforcement Authority 
In TermoRio, the D.C. Circuit slightly widened the enforceability of 
annulled awards, dependent upon whether the award violated basic notions 
of justice.94  Yet, the court never outlined what such a violation would entail.  
The dispute in TermoRio arose after a breach of a contract between an energy 
generator, TermoRio S.A. E.S.P., and a state-owned public utility 
company.95  Here, the arbitral tribunal in Colombia found in favor of 
TermoRio, but this award was later nullified by the highest Colombian 
administrative court because the contract’s arbitration clause violated 
Colombian law.96  TermoRio filed suit in the District Court against 
Electranta and the Colombian government, seeking to have the original 
award enforced.97  The court dismissed TermoRio’s claim because the 
decision to nullify the award was made by a competent authority.98  
The D.C. Circuit Court considered a similar rationale in TermoRio, as it 
did in Chromalloy. There, the court analyzed the U.S. policy in favor of 
arbitral dispute resolution, the rule of comity, and the enforcement 
exceptions enumerated in the New York Convention.99  The court considered 
public policy and acknowledged the importance of “limit[ing] the occasions 
when a foreign judgment is ignored on [the] grounds of public policy.”100  
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 93 Hanson, supra note 79, at 849.  
 94 TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 939 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  
 95 Id. at 929.  
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Ultimately, the court decided that enforcing the award would “undermine a 
principal precept of the New York Convention: an arbitration award does not 
exist to be enforced in other Contracting States if it has been lawfully ‘set 
aside’ by a competent authority in the State in which the award was 
made.”101  The only exception to this is when “a foreign judgment is 
unenforceable as against public policy to the extent that it is ‘repugnant to 
fundamental notions of what is decent and just in the United States,’ ” yet the 
court did not define what would constitute such an extreme violation of U.S. 
public policy.102  The Second Circuit’s decision in COMMISA v. PEP finally 
offered insight into public policy principles that justify the enforcement of an 
annulled award.   
IV.  INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO ENFORCEMENT 
The Second Circuit’s enforcement approach broadened the scope of the 
enforceability of arbitral awards within the United States.  It aligned more 
closely with European states that have enforced awards based on public 
policy to accord with domestic or international policy.  This enforcement 
rationale is an equally protectionist response to the protectionist nature of the 
Mexican government and other foreign states that have insulated their 
government-owned industries from arbitration.  
A.  Ability to Annul Arbitral Awards 
Many governments have found that they do not have the ability to annul 
awards arbitrated in another state, yet they have created a “work-around” of 
sorts to enforce awards annulled in other states, allowing them to insert their 
policy preferences and protect parties against what they view as corruption or 
illegitimate decisions.  As previously discussed,  
the New York Convention sets only the minimum conditions 
for the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
and “does not deprive any interested party of any right he may 
have to avail himself of an arbitral award in the manner and to 
the extent allowed by the law or treaties of the country where 
such award is sought to be relied upon.”103  
                                                                                                                   
 101 Id. at 936.  
 102 Id. at 939 (quoting Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).  
 103 HAMID G. GHARAVI, THE INTERNATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ANNULMENT OF AN 
ARBITRAL AWARD 77 (2002).  
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The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) Rules, has adopted “[t]he principle of the exclusive 
jurisdiction of courts at the place of arbitration to annul arbitral 
awards. . . . ‘only if the place of arbitration is in the territory of [the] 
State.’ ”104  A number of states have adopted this principle.105  Some states, 
such as France have taken this principle further and will enforce awards 
annulled outside their jurisdiction “in accordance with the views of the place 
of enforcement.”106  
While clearly the minority, a number of states have adopted this view, 
allowing the enforcement of awards annulled in the arbitral forum in 
accordance with the legal principles valued in the country of enforcement.107  
The scope of enforcement and the rationales vary between countries, with 
France arguably having the greatest latitude to enforce annulled awards.108  
These enforcement theories allow states to advance both their domestic 
judicial policies, as well as their policies regarding international legal values.  
1.  France: Broad Enforcement Authority 
The French courts first adopted the practice of enforcing awards annulled at 
the seat of arbitration without giving deference to international comity.109  The 
French courts have faced this decision a number of times and have looked to 
                                                                                                                   
 104 See id. at 12 (citing United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985: With Amendments as Adopted in 
2006, art. 34(2)(1) (Vienna: United Nations, 2008).  
 105 See GHARAVI, supra note 103, at 13–14 for a complete list of the states that have adopted 
this principle.  The list includes states such as: Colombia, England, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, India, Iran, Lebanon, Mexico, Russia, and The Netherlands. 
 106 See Emmanuel Gaillard, The Enforcement of Awards Set Aside in the Country of Origin, 
14 ICSID REV. 16, 39 (1999).  Legal scholars have argued that allowing the enforcement of 
annulled awards discourages states from developing arbitration in its jurisdiction.  Gaillard 
argues that in enforcing an annulled award, a “state’s sovereignty over its territory is not in 
question” because the enforcement concerns “the international effect of decisions concerning 
arbitration rendered on a state’s territory,” and issues surrounding the enforcement of such 
awards should be made “in accordance with views of the place of enforcement.”  Id. Accord 
GHARAVI, supra note 103, at 77–86.  
 107 See Bulletin: ICC Guide to National Procedures for Recognition and Enforcement of 
Awards Under the New York Convention, 23 ICC ICARB. BULL., special supplement (2012), 
for a general overview on countries’ responses to the question, “When, if ever, can a party 
obtain recognition of foreign awards which have been set aside by the competent authority 
referred to in Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention?”  
 108 See Gaillard, supra note 106, at 18; GHARAVI, supra note 103, at 86.  
 109 GHARAVI, supra note 103, at 86. 
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“international public policy” as a reason to recognize annulled awards.110  In 
Société Pablak Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. Norsolor S.A., France’s cour de 
cassation recognized an award that had been set aside in Austria after an 
arbitral decision regarding a contractual dispute between Pabalk, a Turkish 
company, and Norsolor, a French company.111  The cour de cassation held that 
Article 7 of the New York Convention “[did] not deprive any interested party 
of any right it may have to avail itself of an arbitral award in a manner and to 
the extent allowed by the law where such award is sought to be relied upon.”112  
Over the next three decades, the French courts refined the French view on the 
enforcement of annulled awards.  
In Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation S.A. v. Hilmarton Ltd., the 
same court clarified their ability to enforce annulled decisions.113 The court 
affirmed the lower court’s enforcement of an award annulled in the arbitral 
forum in Switzerland on the basis that it was an international award, not tied 
to the annulment in Switzerland, and it remained in existence even if “set 
aside and its recognition in France [is] not contrary to international public 
policy.”114  The Swiss courts had annulled the original award favoring 
Hilmarton, yet the French court’s enforcement decision benefitted Omnium 
de Traitement et de Valorisation S.A., a French company rather than 
Hilmarton, a British company.115   
In 2007, in Putrabali Adyamulia v. Rena Holding, France recognized an 
award annulled in the arbitral forum in London.116  In 2001, after arbitration 
proceedings surrounding a breach of contract between an Indonesian 
company, Putrabali, and a French company, Rena Holding, the arbitral 
tribunal found in favor of Rena Holding.117  Putrabali appealed to the High 
Court of London, which annulled the original award and found in favor of 
Putrabali.118  Rena Holding sought to have the original award enforced in 
                                                                                                                   
 110 Société Pablak Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. Norsolor S.A., Cour de cassation [Cass.] 
[supreme court for judicial matters] Oct. 9, 1984, 83-11.355 (Fr.), http://newyorkconvention1 
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 116 Société PT Putrabali Adyamulia v. Société Rena Holding et Société Moguntia Est 
Epices, Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] June 29, 2007, 05-
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Paris, where the court enforced the original award, in their favor.119  The 
French court ultimately held that the arbitral award was enforceable because 
“an international arbitral award, which is not anchored in any national legal 
order, is a decision of international justice whose validity must be 
ascertained with regard to the rules applicable in the country where its 
recognition and enforcement are sought.”120  
Most recently, in Maximov v. Novolipetsky Steel Mill (NLMK), the French 
cour de cassation enforced an award that the arbitral forum in Russia had 
previously annulled.121  Despite the differences in these holdings, the French 
cour de cassation has repeatedly enforced annulled awards on the notion that 
the awards are not tied to the policies of the arbitral forum, despite 
contravening principles of international comity.122 
2.  The Netherlands: Narrow Enforcement Authority 
Dutch courts have also asserted their ability to enforce awards annulled at 
the seat of arbitration, albeit, with a much narrower approach.  They have 
exercised their discretion in enforcing awards on the basis of specific 
evidence that the annulment was a result of unfair proceedings.123  In Yukos 
Capital S.A.R.L. v. OAO Rosneft, the Court of Appeal in Amsterdam 
enforced an award that had been set aside in Russia, the arbitral forum.124  
The court reasoned that “it [was] in this way plausible that the judgments of 
the Russian civil court in which the arbitrat[ion] awards were set aside the 
result of a judicial process that must be qualified as partial and 
dependent.”125  Despite its narrower approach, the Dutch court reached the 
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 121 Maximov v. Novolipetsky Steel Mill (NLMK), Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court 
for judicial matters] Jan. 30, 2012, 9A40-35844/2011-69-311 (Fr.).  For a discussion of this 
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[supreme court for judicial matters] Oct. 9, 1984, 83-11.355 (Fr.); Société Hilmarton Ltd. v. 
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 123 See Bulletin: ICC Guide to National Procedures for Recognition and Enforcement of 
Awards Under the New York Convention, supra note 107.  
 124 Amsterdam Court of Appeals judgment of 28 April 2009, Yukos Capital S.A.R.L. v. 
OAO Rosneft 200.005.269/01 (Neth.). 
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same conclusion in Maximov v. NLMK.126  Here, the Amsterdam Court of 
Appeal found that the Russian arbitration court’s annulment of the arbitration 
award was “defective in respect of such essential issues that it no longer can 
be said that [it] was a fair trial.”127  Based off of the Dutch decisions in 
Maximov and Yukos, there is a heavy emphasis on the fairness of award 
procedure in the arbitral forum, reflecting the importance of impartiality and 
equality in arbitral proceedings. 
3.  No Enforcement Authority 
Other states, such as the United Kingdom and Germany, take an opposite 
approach.  In Germany, courts defer to principles of international comity in 
declining to enforce annulled awards.128  The Hungarian legislature’s 
“Enforcement Act” lays out a step-by-step analysis for enforcing awards 
rendered in other jurisdictions, leaving little discretionary authority for courts 
to enforce awards annulled in the arbitral forum.129  In the United Kingdom, 
there is a strong policy of respecting international comity by enforcing 
awards, so long as they are not contrary to public policy in the arbitral 
forum.130  English courts defer to other states, “even if English law would 
have arrived at a different result on the ground that the underlying contract 
breached public policy because its performance involved a breach of 
statutory regulation in the place of performance.”131  
B.  The Paulsson—van den Berg Debate  
Despite a plain language reading of the New York Convention, there is 
heavily commentated disagreement about the enforceability of annulled 
awards that centers around the role of the seat of the arbitration.  For the 
purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that arbitral seats have a right to set 
                                                                                                                   
 126 Hof Amsterdam 18 September 2012, 200.100.508/01 m.nt. (Maximov/NLMK) (Neth.). 
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aside awards, but nonetheless it is important to consider where this argument 
falls within the debate.  
Arbitration scholars, Jan Paulsson and Albert Jan van den Berg infamously 
debated the scope of the New York Convention regarding the enforcement of 
annulled arbitration awards. Paulsson argued that all annulments do not have 
to be given effect by the enforcing state.132  In his analysis of the New York 
Convention, Paulsson explained that a “core objective” of the New York 
Convention was “to free the international arbitral process from domination by 
the law of the place of arbitration.”133  Paulsson advocated for enforcement 
courts to “consider the grounds upon which awards are set aside, and exercise 
their discretion to disregard” annulments based on local standards in the forum 
state.134  Conversely, van den Berg posited that the “generally accepted rule” 
regarding annulled awards under the New York Convention is that set aside 
awards cannot be enforced elsewhere because “[the] concentration of judicial 
control over the arbitral process [is] at the place of arbitration.”135  Van den 
Berg explains that if an enforcing court concluded that it could not enforce the 
annulled award under the New York Convention, it could look to its domestic 
law, but even under its domestic law it is unlikely that there is such a basis to 
enforce an annulled award.136  
Regardless of the differences between the pro-enforcement and no 
enforcement approaches taken by states and scholars, a state’s enforcement 
stance reflects its judicial values.  Paulsson and van den Berg are both 
arguably correct in their views of the scope of enforcement of the New York 
Convention.  While a state’s enforcement decisions do not necessarily favor 
entities in the place of enforcement, they do favor their state’s judicial values 
and allow those values to be advanced in response to protectionist arbitral 
decisions and laws in the arbitral forum.137   
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V.  ANALYZING THE PROTECTIONIST RATIONALE IN ENFORCING ANNULLED 
AWARDS 
While enforcing annulled awards allows states to protect their own 
industries and subsidiaries against protectionist actions by other states, this 
pro-enforcement ability also protects Western judicial policies and values.  
The Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit followed the pro-
enforcement interpretation by enforcing the award annulled by the Mexican 
courts because doing so was necessary to “vindicate ‘fundamental notions of 
what is decent and just’ in the United States.”138  This protectionist decision 
is evidenced by the invocation of American jurisprudence policies in the 
court’s discussion of whether to enforce an award regarding a contract that 
specifically applied the laws of Mexico.139  The Second Circuit’s 
constitutional analysis considered principles of judicial equity and ideas of 
government taking.140  Ultimately, the Second Circuit declined to defer to the 
Mexican decision and chose to protect its own “basic standards of justice in 
the United States.”141  This court’s decision in COMMISA v. PEP falls 
somewhere in between Paulsson and van den Berg’s take on the scope of the 
New York Convention because the court used the New York Convention to 
enforce the annulled award based on U.S. domestic legal principles.  
A.  Protectionism in COMMISA v. PEP 
The Second Circuit first considered Mexico’s retroactive ban on 
COMMISA’s claim against PEP because of the May 2009 passage of Section 
98 of the Law of Public Works and Related Services.  This section prevented 
arbitration in situations regarding “administrative rescission [and] early 
termination of the contracts.”142  The court outlined four provisions 
“embedded” in the Constitution, which govern the retroactive application of 
laws:  
  The Ex Post Facto Clause’s ban on retroactive application 
of penal legislation;  
                                                                                                                   
 138 COMMISA v. PEP, 832 F.3d 92, 107 (2d Cir. 2016).   
 139 Id.  
 140 Id.  
 141 Id. at 111 (“[W]e do not think that the Southern District second-guessed the Eleventh 
Collegiate Court, which appears only to have been implementing the law of Mexico.  Rather, 
the Southern District exercised discretion, as allowed by treaty, to assess whether the 
nullification of the award offends basic standards of justice in the United States.”).  
 142 Id. at 99.  
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  The proscription against states retroactively impairing the 
obligation of contracts; 
  The prohibition on Bills of Attainder, stopping legislatures 
from ‘singling out disfavored persons and meting out 
summary punishment for past conduct’; and 
  The Due Process Clause, and corresponding rights to ‘fair 
notice.’ ”143 
Based on these constitutional principles, as well as precedent, the court found 
that “[r]etroactivity is not favored in the law,” particularly because of “the 
unfairness associated with such application.”144  While the court declined to 
refute the Mexican court’s statement that it was not retroactively applying 
Section 98 according to Mexican law, the court found that the effect of the 
award violated key constitutional principles and “resulted in a retroactive 
application of Section 98 as a matter of United States law.”145  Moreover, the 
court’s final assertion that “PEP is part of the government that promulgated 
the law” explains the court’s view that this decision reflected government 
expropriation without compensation and contradicts well-established 
principles of American law.146  
After analyzing Mexico’s annulment in light of the U.S. Constitution, the 
Court considered judicial policy concerning litigants’ right to bring claims 
and the applicable statute of limitations.  The court identified numerous 
precedential decisions affirming that “litigants with legal claims should have 
an opportunity to bring those claims somewhere.”147  “Absent confirmation 
of the award, COMMISA would lose the opportunity to bring its claims 
because of the change in Mexican law subjecting COMMISA’s claims to the 
forty-five-day statute of limitations in the Tax and Administrative Court.”148  
Moreover, because the claims had been presented to the Mexican District 
Court, they would be barred by res judicata, despite having never actually 
                                                                                                                   
 143 Id. at 108.  
 144 Id. (citing Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988); Corporación 
Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, S. de R.L. de C.V. v. Pemex-Exploración y Producción, 
962 F. Supp. 2d 642, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)).  
 145 Id. (“[I]t is incontestable that the capacity of PEP to arbitrate was established in prior 
law; that it was withdrawn with respect to certain disputes that had already arisen; and that it 
was withdrawn in a way that frustrated contractual expectation, undid an arbitral award, and 
precluded redress by COMMISA in any forum.”). 
 146 Id. at 109.  
 147 Id. (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981); S. Pac. Terminal 
Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911); Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 
1309, 1317 (2012)).  
 148 Id. at 110.  
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been heard.149  The court then addressed the “equitable concerns” 
surrounding claim preclusion raised by the Mexican Court’s annulment—
COMMISA’s claims had been barred twice in Mexican court, in violation of 
the basic U.S. principles of claim preclusion.150  
Finally, the court considered “[g]overnment [e]xpropriation [w]ithout 
[c]ompensation.”151  The court found that PEP, acting for the Mexican 
government, rescinded the contract with COMMISA, and then the Mexican 
legislature “frustrated relief that had been granted to COMMISA” before 
barring its claim based on the statute of limitations and res judicata.152  
Ultimately, this “amounted to a taking of private property without 
compensation for the benefit of the government.”153  The court invoked U.S. 
judicial policy by stating that this would be an unconstitutional taking in the 
U.S. and a violation of NAFTA.154  
Despite the application of U.S. judicial policy in interpreting the 
enforceability of a Mexican contract annulled in Mexico, commentators have 
concluded that the Southern District of New York and Second Circuit’s 
decisions align with the pro-enforcement policy of other states, although the 
U.S.’ rationale is different than the broad enforcement approach of France.155  
                                                                                                                   
 149 Id.  
 150 Id.  COMMISA’s failed amparo action prevented the arbitral panel from adjudicating the 
claim, and later § 98 resulted in the Tax and Administrative Court rejecting COMMISA’s 
claim based on res judicata.  “Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action 
precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating [sic] issues that were or could have been 
raised in the action.”  Id. (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)).  Yet, COMMISA 
never had the opportunity to litigate its breach of contract claim against PEP because it was 
twice subjected to changing laws which barred its claim.  
 151 Id.  
 152 Id.  
 153 Id.  
 154 Id. (citing NAFTA art. 1110, Jan. 1, 1994 “No party may . . . take a measure tantamount 
to nationalization or expropriation of such an investment (‘expropriation’), except . . . on 
payment of compensation. . . .”).  
 155 Monique Sasson, The Question of U.S. Enforcement of Annulled Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
AM. B. ASS’N (Feb. 6, 2014), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/adr/articles/wint 
er2014-0214-question-of-us-enforcement.html (stating that “[i]n the Southern District’s view, the 
Mexican judgment vacating the award was adopted in violation of basic notions of justice.  
Under the Panama and New York Conventions, this should not be regarded as a strange 
approach.  Indeed, enforcement of awards set aside at the seat is viewed as appropriate in a 
number of countries, such as France, even with no showing of a violation of basic notions of 
justice, on the grounds that an annulled award is still alive outside the country that vacated it.”). 
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B.  Protectionism in Arbitration: Annulling Awards and Limiting Arbitration  
The Second Circuit’s decision in COMMISA v. PEP was an effort to 
protect the arbitration practice as a whole, while also upholding American 
judicial values in light of a protectionist decision by another state.  
The original agreement between COMMISA and PEP provided that: 
[a]ny controversy, claim, difference, or dispute that may arise 
from or that is related to, or associated with, the present 
Contract or any instance of breach with the present Contract, 
shall be definitively settled through arbitration conducted in 
Mexico City, D.F., in accordance with the Conciliation and 
Arbitration Regulations of the International Chamber of 
Commerce that are in effect at that time.156  
According to ICC Article 34(6), “Every award shall be binding on the 
parties.  By submitting the dispute to arbitration under the Rules, the parties 
undertake to carry out any award without delay and shall be deemed to have 
waived their right to any form of recourse insofar as such waiver can validly 
be made.”157  Under Article 29, awards can be annulled by an emergency 
arbitrator.158  Yet, in the instance of COMMISA v. PEP, the arbitral award 
was annulled by the Mexican courts after a retroactive application of a 
modified law that prevented arbitration in contractual disputes concerning 
government parties.159  Mexico’s passage of Section 98, which changed the 
forum to adjudicate public contracts to the Tax and Administrative Court, 
insulated the Mexican government from unfavorable arbitral decisions and 
the uncertainty that could result from the flexible arbitral process by allowing 
all decisions regarding public contracts to be adjudicated in the same court, 
by the same pool of judges, and under the same applicable law.160  
This protectionist method, employed by the Mexican government in 
COMMISA v. PEP, parallels recent arbitral law changes made by the Russian 
government.161  On September 1, 2016, Russia’s new international arbitration 
                                                                                                                   
 156 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss the Petition and 
in Support of Petitioner’s Motion to Confirm Arbitral Award at 4, Corporación Mexicana de 
Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. De C.V., v. Pemex-Exploración y Producción, No. 1:10-
cv-206 (AKH), 2010 WL 9512897 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  
 157 International Chamber of Commerce, Rules of the Court of Arbitration, art. 34 (2012).  
 158 Id. art. 29.  
 159 See COMMISA v. PEP, 832 F.3d 92, 99 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 160 Id.  
 161 Public Works and Related Services Law, art. 98 (Mex.).  Accord Federal’nyi Zakon RF 
[Federal Law “On Arbitration (Arbitral Proceedings) in the Russian Federation”], Federal 
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laws went into effect.162  The laws includes a list of public law disputes that 
are not subject to arbitration and must be adjudicated in a Russian court.163  
This list includes: “[D]isputes arising out of a government or municipal 
procurement of goods and services,” which could not be arbitrated prior to 
the enactment of these laws and can still not be arbitrated, while 
“administrative offences,” and “annulment of acts or decisions of public 
authorities” can no longer be arbitrated.164  
Like the Mexican government’s behavior regarding COMMISA and the 
invocation of Section 98, Russia’s ban on arbitration regarding a number of 
public contracts allows the Russian government to insulate itself from less 
predictable outcomes.165  After decisions such as that which led to Yukos 
Capital S.A.R.L. v. OAO Rosneft in the Netherlands, it is understandable why 
the Russian government would seek to prevent such unfavorable outcomes 
by limiting the situations in which awards could be rendered against a state-
controlled entity.166  While arbitration allows for flexibility, and in some 
instances more favorable and predictable outcomes by the contracting parties 
when unfavorable awards have been rendered against state entities, the 
                                                                                                                   
Law No. 382-FZ (Dec. 29, 2015), and Federal’nyi Zakon RF [Amendments to Certain 
Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation and the Repeal of Article 6(1)(3) of the Federal 
Law on Self-Regulating Organizations in Connection with the Adoption of the Federal Law 
on Arbitration in the Russian Federation], Federal Law No. 409-FZ (Dec. 29, 2015).  
 162 Federal’nyi Zakon RF [Federal Law “On Arbitration (Arbitral Proceedings) in the 
Russian Federation”], Federal Law No. 382-FZ (Dec. 29, 2015), and Federal’nyi Zakon RF 
[Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation and the Repeal of Article 
6(1)(3) of the Federal Law on Self-Regulating Organizations in Connection with the Adoption 
of the Federal Law on Arbitration in the Russian Federation], Federal Law No. 409-FZ (Dec. 
29, 2015).  
 163 Federal’nyi Zakon RF [Federal Law “On Arbitration (Arbitral Proceedings) in the 
Russian Federation”], Federal Law No. 382-FZ (Dec. 29, 2015), and Federal’nyi Zakon RF 
[Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation and the Repeal of Article 
6(1)(3) of the Federal Law on Self-Regulating Organizations in Connection with the Adoption 
of the Federal Law on Arbitration in the Russian Federation], Federal Law No. 409-FZ (Dec. 
29, 2015).  
 164 Id.  Accord Steven P. Finizio & Dmitry Andreev, International Arbitration Alert: Russia 
Implements Arbitration Reform, WILMER HALE (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.wilmerhale. 
com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/WH_Publications/Client_Alert_PD
fs/2016-08-31-russia-implements-arbitration-reform.pdf. 
 165 Compare COMMISA v. PEP, 832 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2016), with Federal’nyi Zakon RF 
[Federal Law “On Arbitration (Arbitral Proceedings) in the Russian Federation”], Federal 
Law No. 382-FZ (Dec. 29, 2015), and Federal’nyi Zakon RF [Amendments to Certain 
Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation and the Repeal of Article 6(1)(3) of the Federal 
Law on Self-Regulating Organizations in Connection with the Adoption of the Federal Law 
on Arbitration in the Russian Federation], Federal Law No. 409-FZ (Dec. 29, 2015).  
 166 See Hof Amsterdam 28 April 2009, 200.005.269/01 m.nt. (Yukos Capital S.A.R.L./OAO 
Rosneft) (Neth.). An unofficial translation of this decision is available at: https://www.iiiglob 
al.org/sites/default/files/media/Yukos_Capitla_SARC_V_OAO_Rosneft.PDF. 
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state’s own judicial system appears to be a more appealing location to 
adjudicate disputes.  Yet, decisions that protect a state entity, over an 
international—or even separate domestic entity—push other states to resort 
to their own protectionist methods by seeking to protect either their own 
judicial values, international legal standards, or the purpose of international 
arbitration.  As will be explained below, this is what the U.S., France, the 
Netherlands and other pro-enforcement states have done in deciding to 
enforce awards annulled in the arbitral forum. 
C.  Protecting Arbitration and Judicial Values 
International arbitration furthers “the expeditious resolution of disputes 
and the avoidance of protracted and expensive litigation.”167  International 
arbitration allows the parties to decide on a dispute resolution process at the 
time of contracting and allows for flexibility regarding time frames, 
expenses, procedural decisions, confidentiality, arbitrator and expertise 
decisions, and finality.168  While arbitral rules allow awards to be annulled in 
the arbitral forum by the arbitral tribunal when particular conditions are 
present, enforcing states have taken the opportunity to uphold these awards 
to further domestic judicial principles and the core purposes of international 
arbitration when the awards are annulled apart from the arbitral tribunal.169  
This is what the Second Circuit did by affirming the Southern District’s 
decision in COMMISA v. PEP and what the French courts have done 
numerous times by enforcing annulled awards.  
In COMMISA v. PEP, the Southern District of New York confirmed the 
annulled award because the retroactive application of Section 98 would 
effectively prevent COMMISA from having any recourse for the breach of a 
                                                                                                                   
 167 See Europcar Italia, S.p.A. v. Maiellano Tours, Inc., 156 F.3d 310, 317 (2d Cir. 1998).  
 168 See Sussman & Wilkinson, supra note 14.  Accord W. Laurence Craig, The Arbitrator’s 
Mission and the Application of Law in International Commercial Arbitration, 21 AM. REV. 
INT’L ARB. 243, 245 (2010) (“[I]nternational commercial arbitration has in the past been 
considered to be a process that favors the application of the agreement of the parties, but also 
stresses compromise and the application of equitable and commercial principles to alleviate 
the strict application of law.”).  
 169 See In re Chromalloy Aeroservices and the Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 906 
(D.C. Cir. 1996); Société PT Putrabali Adyamulia v. Société Rena Holding et Société 
Moguntia Est Epices,  Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] June 29, 
2007, 05-18.053 (Fr.); Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation SA v. Hilmarton Ltd. (1999), 
2 All ER 146 (Comm.) 146 (Eng.); Société Pablak Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. Norsolor S.A., 
Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] Oct. 9, 1984, 83-11.355 (Fr.); 
Hof Amsterdam 18 Sept. 2012, m.nt. (Maximov/NLMK) (Neth.); Hof Amsterdam 28 April 
2009, 200.005.269/01 m.nt. (Yukos Capital S.A.R.L./OAO Rosneft) (Neth.).   
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contract that it had substantially completed.170  The court considered four 
judicial factors that are highly valued in both domestic judicial systems and the 
larger international legal system.171  International comity is also highly valued 
by both the U.S. courts and the international legal system.172  Yet, deferring to 
international comity would negate the United States’ ability to consider the 
importance of claims having an appropriate forum, or any forum at all, when 
the international annulment contradicts key judicial principles, such as those 
outlined by the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit in 
COMMISA v. PEP.  This decision allowed the U.S. court to protect its judicial 
values in response to what was a protectionist effort in the arbitral forum.  
France has used a similar protectionist approach by enforcing annulled 
awards.  In Putrabali, the French court ultimately held that the arbitral award 
was enforceable because “an international arbitral award, which is not 
anchored in any national legal order, is a decision of international justice 
whose validity must be ascertained with regard to the rules applicable in the 
country where its recognition and enforcement are sought.”173  Given the 
court’s finding that the award should not have been annulled, rather than 
deferring to international comity, it relied on appropriate enforcement 
standards in France, thereby protecting French judicial policy.174  This is the 
same approach France has taken in other pro-enforcement decisions.175  
States’ decisions to protect their domestic judicial values and interpretations 
of international judicial values protect the overall purposes of international 
arbitration.    
                                                                                                                   
 170 See COMMISA v. PEP, 832 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2016).   
 171 Id. at 107 (outlining four factors: “(1) the vindication of contractual undertakings and the 
waiver of sovereign immunity; (2) the repugnancy of retroactive legislation that disrupts 
contractual expectations; (3) the need to ensure legal claims find a forum; and (4) the 
prohibition against government expropriation without compensation”) (citing Landgraf v. USI 
Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994) (explaining that “the presumption against retroactive 
legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine older than our 
Republic.  Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an 
opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly. . . .”)). 
 172 Id. at 100.  The court explains that an appeals court must review a lower court’s decision 
to not defer to international comity for abuse of discretion.  This is a higher standard, under 
which a district court decision will be upheld so long as it “falls within a broad range of 
permissible conclusions.”  Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 400 (1990).  
 173 Société PT Putrabali Adyamulia v. Société Rena Holding et Société Moguntia Est 
Epices, Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] June 29, 2007, 05-
18.053 (Fr.). 
 174 Id.  
 175 See Société Pablak Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. Norsolor S.A., available at Cour de 
cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] Oct. 9, 1984, 83-11.355 (Fr.).  
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D.  Enforcing Annulled Awards: Upholding Pre-Contractual Expectations 
and the Purposes of International Arbitration 
Enforcing annulled awards allows courts to protect contractual 
obligations in other forums.  One of the Southern District of New York’s key 
considerations in COMMISA v. PEP was “the repugnancy of retroactive 
legislation that disrupts contractual expectations.”176  In contractual disputes, 
the United States often defers to the expectations set out in the contract at the 
time the contract was made.177  The court seeks to understand what the 
parties reasonably anticipated, or could have reasonably anticipated, at the 
time they made the contract.178  This method of seeking to uphold the parties’ 
expectations at the time of contracting and the considerations the parties 
made in deciding on the terms of their contract allows disputes to be resolved 
in a manner that upholds the value of the contractual process.179  This is 
evidenced by the fact that only under certain situations, such as duress or 
undue influence, are contractual breaches voidable; and, therefore, not 
subject to stringent damages.180  Moreover, within the arbitration context, 
U.S. courts often apply these same policies by generally deferring to the 
terms outlined by the parties’ arbitration agreement in the original contract, 
unless the agreement was procedurally or substantively unconscionable.181  A 
strong preference is given to the parties’ expectations and desires at the time 
they entered into the agreement.182 
                                                                                                                   
 176 COMMISA v. PEP, 832 F.3d 92, 107 (2d Cir. 2016).   
 177 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(b) AM. LAW INST. (1981) (stating 
that “a party bears the risk of a mistake when (b) he is aware, at the time the contract [was] 
made, that he has only limited knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake 
relates. . . .” (emphasis added)); U.C.C. § 2-715 (stating that “[c]onsequential damages 
resulting from the seller’s breach include (a) any loss resulting from general or particular 
requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and 
which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise” (emphasis added)); Hadley v. 
Baxendale (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145; 9 LR Exch. 341 (holding that the breaching party is 
responsible for damages that were reasonably foreseeable “at the time they made the 
contract . . .” (emphasis added)).  
 178 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(b); U.C.C. § 2-715; Hadley 
(1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145. 
 179 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(b); U.C.C. § 2-715; Hadley 
(1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145. 
 180 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 AM. LAW INST. (1981) 
(explaining that a manifestation of assent induced by undue influence makes a contract 
voidable); Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School Dist., 54 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1966) (holding that undue 
influence from over-persuasion can make a contract voidable).  
 181 See, e.g., In re RealNetworks, Inc., No. 00 C 1366, 2000 WL 631341 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 
2000).  
 182 See, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995) (holding 
that an arbitral award should be enforced based on the language of the parties’ agreement). 
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At the time COMMISA and PEP contracted to build the oil platform, both 
parties made contractual decisions with the intent to resolve any disputes in 
arbitration, should they arise.183  By allowing parties to determine the 
specific rules governing their contracts, arbitration agreements allow parties 
to negate the risks involved with entering into high-cost contracts in foreign 
areas, particularly when foreign governments are involved.184  This is the 
case with COMMISA and PEP.185  Given that arbitration allows the parties 
to select the procedural and substantive law that will be applied to adjudicate 
their dispute and to select their arbitrators, parties are able to ensure that they 
will not be subject to changing laws or policies that can unfairly prejudice an 
international party.186  Ultimately, the agreement to arbitrate any dispute 
allowed COMMISA to negate, or at least minimize, the risks involved in 
such high-value international contracts. 
In contract disputes, U.S. courts look to the contract to see if either party 
has allocated the risk.187  Resorting to arbitration is a way for parties to 
specifically ensure that they have not allocated to themselves the risk of 
changing policies, norms, or laws when they are carrying out a contract in a 
foreign state.188  Moreover, arbitration allows parties to separate their claims 
from their own states or the location of the dispute by allowing parties to 
determine procedural and substantive rules.189  COMMISA’s right to 
arbitrate any dispute that arose out of its contract with PEP was a way to 
ensure that the risk was not allocated to COMMISA and that it would be 
protected from any unforeseen changes that would affect its rights in the 
Mexican judicial system.  
                                                                                                                   
 183 COMMISA v. PEP, 832 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 184 See id.  
 185 See Sussman & Wilkinson, supra note 14.  
 186 Id.  
 187 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(a) AM. LAW INST. (1981) (stating 
that “[a] party bears the risk of a mistake when (a) the risk is allocated to him by agreement of 
the parties. . . ” (emphasis added)); Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Grp., Inc., 499 F. Supp. 
53, 67 (W.D. Penn. 1980) (stating that in particular situations “the court must allocate the risk 
in some reasoned way” (emphasis added)).  
 188 See BORN, supra note 16, at 71 (explaining that “[p]recisely because national legal 
systems differ profoundly, parties inevitably seek to ensure that, if international disputes arise, 
those disputes are resolved in the forum that is most favorable to their interests”).  
 189 Id. at 73–74 (explaining that “[o]ne of the central objectives of international arbitration 
agreements is to provide a neutral forum for dispute resolution, detached from either the 
parties or their respective home state governments”).   
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E.  Upholding the Parties’ Informed Expectations 
U.S. courts generally defer to arbitration when parties explicitly allow for 
this in their original contract.  Similar to the flexibility arbitration affords 
parties, allowing parties to determine at the time of contracting that any 
disputes that may arise will be adjudicated by arbitration permits the parties 
to have informed expectations about what laws will govern their contract.  
This is particularly important when multiple jurisdictions are concerned with 
fulfilling expectations outlined in a contract.  
At the time COMMISA and PEP entered into their original contract, they 
explicitly stated that all disputes would be adjudicated through arbitration.  
Consequently, when COMMISA sought arbitration to resolve this 
contractual breach between the parties, COMMISA believed this arbitral 
award would be final unless there was a reason to set it aside under the 
Panama Convention.190  Here, that was not the case.  Mexico changed its law 
regarding government procurement contracts and retroactively applied this 
law to the original contract between COMMISA and PEP.191  The retroactive 
application of laws negated the informed expectations the parties had at the 
time they entered into the contract.192  While the retroactive application of 
laws can occur with administrative laws, there is a strong preference against 
the retroactive application of laws in the United States.193  Retroactively 
applying Mexico’s ban on arbitration involving government procurement 
contracts not only prevented COMMISA from having its claim arbitrated, 
but it also prevented COMMISA from having any recourse for its breach of 
contract.  This total ban on a forum in which COMMISA could have its 
claim heard violated not only COMMISA’s expectation that it would have an 
arbitral forum in which its dispute could be heard, but also its expectation 
that there would be a forum in which to hear its dispute.  This violates a core 
principle of the U.S. legal system—one’s right to have their dispute heard in 
a court of law.194 
                                                                                                                   
 190 See COMMISA v. PEP, 832 F.3d 92, 108 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 191 Id. at 99. 
 192 See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994) (explaining that retroactively 
enforced statutes raise concerns about the Legislature’s power “to sweep away settled 
expectations suddenly,” and as “a means of retribution against unpopular groups or individuals”).   
 193 See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208–09 (1988) (explaining 
that “[r]etroactivity is not favored in the law. . . . Even where some substantial justification for 
retroactive rulemaking is presented, courts should be reluctant to find such authority absent an 
express statutory grant.”).  
 194 See COMMISA, 832 F.3d at 109 (explaining that “litigants with legal claims should have an 
opportunity to bring those claims somewhere” (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 
254 n.22 (1981); S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 219 U.S. 498, 515 
(1911); Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2012))).  
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F.  Protecting International Comity 
Finally, despite being an international rather than a domestic principle, 
international comity is a core tenant of U.S. courts’ decisions regarding 
private international law.195  The United States has a strong preference of 
deferring to international comity to determine whether to enforce awards 
annulled in their arbitral forum.196  This principle is explained in many 
arbitration enforcement decisions and in other cases of international 
litigation.  In First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that the executive branch, rather than judges, has the 
responsibility to recognize the consequences of other states implementing 
legislation that is “contrary to essential principles of justice and morality.”197  
However, the Supreme Court has explained that there are certain situations in 
which deference to international comity would not be proper.198  Such was 
the case in Hartford Fire Insurance Company v. California.199  Here, the 
Supreme Court decided that while the lower court had the discretion to defer 
to international comity and refuse to consider the substance of the claim, it 
was improper to defer to international comity in such a significant antitrust 
case.200  Another instance is when doing so would be “repugnant to 
fundamental notions of what is decent and just”—this was the case in 
COMMISA v. PEP.201 
In COMMISA v. PEP, the Southern District of New York and the Second 
Circuit undoubtedly had the authority to enforce the annulled arbitration award 
under the New York and Panama Conventions.  Yet, the United States looked 
to international comity before deciding to enforce the annulled award.  The 
                                                                                                                   
 195 See Paul, supra note 18, at 19–38. 
 196 See In re Chromalloy Aeroservices and the Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907 
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Second Circuit reviewed the Southern District of New York’s decision to deny 
international comity to Mexico’s award for an abuse of discretion.202  
Ultimately, despite the “prudential concern of international comity,” the 
Second Circuit concluded that deferring to international comity in this 
situation would offend U.S. public policy.203  The circumstances surrounding 
COMMISA v. PEP were similar to those outlined in Hartford Fire Insurance 
Company v. California, as it was decided that the court could not blindly defer 
to international comity because doing so would violate U.S. public policy by 
choosing an outcome that favored the retroactive application of laws.204   
G.  Possible Enforcement Scenarios in the United States 
The situation in COMMISA v. PEP posed a unique set of circumstances 
for the Southern District of New York and then the Second Circuit to grapple 
with in determining whether to enforce the award that the Mexican court 
later annulled.  The parties explicitly contracted for arbitration to resolve any 
dispute that may arise during the course of the relationship.205  This 
arbitration provision was intended to ensure the speedy, fair, and flexible 
adjudication of disputes, should they arise.206  The United States has a strong 
principle in favor of arbitration when parties have particularly contracted for 
arbitration.207  Despite the reasons the parties have for choosing to arbitrate 
their disputes rather than take them to a court, it is possible, but unlikely, that 
considering the principle of international comity, the Southern District of 
New York would not have enforced the annulled award even if COMMISA 
had the opportunity to have its claim heard in any legal forum in Mexico.  
In COMMISA v. PEP, the Mexican legislature changed the applicable 
statute of limitations for government procurement disputes from ten years to 
forty-five days.208  This action completely barred COMMISA from initiating 
a law suit because more than forty-five days had passed before COMMISA 
brought its claim to the Tax and Administrative Court.209  Even if 
COMMISA had been able to litigate its claim in court, it is still unlikely that 
                                                                                                                   
 202 Id. at 100 (citing Finanz AG Zurich v. Banco Economico S.A., 192 F.3d 240, 246 (2d Cir. 
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the Second Circuit would have upheld this decision.  Arbitration allows 
parties to select a forum that will limit national bias and foster impartial 
decisions.210  Impartiality is not guaranteed when local courts are left to 
adjudicate a dispute between a local party and a foreign party.211  Even 
considering principles of international comity, upholding the decision of the 
Mexican court to set aside COMMISA’s award would have undermined the 
United States’ policy of deferring to the parties’ expectations at the time of 
contracting because the parties explicitly contracted for arbitration to resolve 
any dispute that might arise.212  
While COMMISA v. PEP was in many ways viewed as a revolutionary 
decision by the Second Circuit, it is not likely to lead to an influx of 
enforcement cases for U.S. courts to adjudicate. Only in certain, rare 
circumstances, such as the one outlined in COMMISA v. PEP, will U.S. 
courts be likely to enforce an annulled award because enforcing such an 
award violates international comity.  Regardless, by choosing to enforce or 
not to enforce an award annulled by the protectionist decision of another 
state, the United States is protecting core principles of contract law, one’s 
right to have their claim heard, the purposes of international arbitration, and 
international comity.  
VI.  CONCLUSION  
While in COMMISA v. PEP the United States appears to have adopted the 
same broad enforcement authority as the French courts have adopted, the 
Second Circuit’s affirmation of the Southern District of New York’s award 
closely follows the narrow enforcement authority adopted in Chromalloy 
some twenty years prior.  The United States sits squarely in the middle of the 
enforcement spectrum by adopting this narrow-enforcement authority 
approach, and this is the best place for U.S. courts to remain.  By exercising 
a narrow-enforcement authority, U.S. courts can protect U.S. judicial values, 
while also protecting core international judicial principles, such as 
international comity—another value of the U.S. legal system.  
                                                                                                                   
 210 See BORN, supra note 16, at 75 (explaining that “[i]nternational arbitration permits 
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